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Is There a Pre-Charge Conferral Right
in the CVRA?
Elliot Smitht

INTRODUCTION

The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston,
Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act
("CVRA") provides victims of crime with eight enumerated rights
in relation to the government's prosecution of a federal offense. 1
Among these rights is the "reasonable right to confer with the
attorney for the Government in the case." 2 Unfortunately, the
contours of the conferral right are unclear. One commentator has
noted: "Most ambiguous of the lot [of victim consultation statutes] is the consultation requirement as stated in the federal
statute and in a handful of the state provisions." 3 For one thing,
from the language granting the right, it cannot be determined
when a victim's conferral right attaches. For another, because
"there is not even a hint as to what the subject of the contemplated consulting/conferring is expected to be," 4 the purpose and
scope of the right are hardly obvious.
In broad terms, the question with respect to attachment is
whether a victim's conferral right becomes enforceable exclusively after the point at which the government files charges against a
defendant, or whether there are circumstances under which the
right might attach earlier.
As to the purpose and scope of the conferral right, the particular issue discussed in this Comment is whether victims are
entitled to have their views considered by the prosecutor in the
case before the prosecutor reaches a plea agreement with the
t BA 2003, University of Rochester; MA 2005, Teacher's College, Columbia
University; JD Candidate 2011, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn
Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), Pub L No 108-405, 118 Stat 2261 (2004), codified at
18 USC § 3771 (2006).
2 18 USC § 3771(a)(5).
3 Wayne R. LaFave et al, 5 CriminalProcedure§ 21.3(f) at 769 (West 3d ed 2007).
4 Id at 769-70.
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defendant. The conferral right may be most important to victims
at the plea bargaining stage. Although the CVRA provides victims with the right to express their views to the court at plea
hearings, 5 the impact of a victim's input may be greater before
the prosecutor negotiates a plea agreement that gains momen6
tum and effectively determines the course of the case.
With the "unprecedented frauds that have been exposed during the current financial crisis[, leaving] in their wake a flood of
victims," 7 the importance of clarifying the scope of victims' rights
and when the rights attach has increased. This is especially true
in relation to plea bargaining because the vast majority of federal
8
criminal cases end with the defendant's guilty plea.
Assuming that the right to "confer with the attorney for the
Government in the case" generally provides victims with the
right to express their views to the prosecutor before a plea
agreement is reached, 9 the point at which the conferral right attaches can take on great importance under certain circumstances. Because of the dynamics of federal guidelines sentencing, plea
bargaining sometimes takes place before charges are brought
against the defendant. 10 Of particular interest during the recession is the context of white collar crime, in which the importance
of pre-charge plea bargaining cannot be overstated. As one commentator has explained, "[w]hether and when to enter into plea
negotiations . .. is the major strategic choice for a defense attorney during the pre-charge period of the criminal defense in white
collar cases."' Pre-charge plea bargaining has advantages for
white-collar defendants.' 2 As a result, "white-collar defense
attorneys tend to regard the case that extends past the precharge

5 See 18 USC § 3771(a)(4).
6 See Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to
Guidelines, 91 Marq L Rev 323, 324 (Fall 2007).
7 Ross J. Ellick and Eric B. Fisher, Crime Victims' Rights Act: New Tool to Recover
FraudLosses, 242 NY L J 58 (Aug 17, 2009).
8 Charles Alan Wright and Andrew D. Leipold, 1A Federal Practice & Procedure:
Criminal§ 180 at 284 (West 4th ed 2008).
9 As explained below, most authorities have concluded that victims are generally
entitled to express their views to the prosecutor in relation to a prospective plea agreement.
10 LaFave et al, 5 CriminalProcedure§ 21.1(h) at 557 (cited in note 3).
11 Kenneth Mann, Defending White-Collar Crime: A Portraitof Attorneys at Work 10
(Yale 1985).
12 Id. The government may be less invested in its case during an earlier stage of
investigation. The defendant may also increase his chances of favorable treatment because of his early cooperation.
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stage as a failure." 13 Assuming the CVRA's conferral right encompasses a victim's right to be heard by the prosecutor before
settlement, victims of white collar crime may be effectively denied the right to confer with the prosecutor if the right does not
attach until charges have been filed.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in In re Dean14 held that the
CVRA's conferral right entitles victims to be heard by prosecutors concerning the victims' views on prospective plea agreements and that this right attaches before charges are filed under
certain circumstances.1 5 The analysis in Dean, however, is contrary to the interpretation given to the conferral right by the
Department of Justice in its Attorney General Guidelines for16
Victim and Witness Assistance (Attorney General Guidelines).
While the Attorney General agrees that prosecutors "should be
available to consult with victims about major case decisions, such
as ... plea negotiations," 17 the Attorney General Guidelines pro-

vide that the right to confer with the prosecutor does not attach
until charges are filed.18
The Dean decision is brief and is susceptible to criticism for
failing to elaborate upon its reasoning. This Comment argues,
however, that the court reached a result that is preferable as a
matter of policy and defensible as a matter of statutory interpretation. The argument begins in section L.A by setting out the major provisions of the CVRA. Section I.B focuses on case law and
other sources bearing on the question of when the victim's right
to confer with the attorney for the government attaches. Section
I.C focuses on case law and other sources bearing on the scope
and purpose of the right to confer. In section II, this Comment
argues that the result reached in Dean-inother words, that the
victim's right to confer attaches to pre-charge plea bargainingis preferable to the result produced by the Attorney General
Guidelines-in other words, that the availability of the right to
confer depends on whether the plea bargaining takes place preor post-charge. Section II is divided into subsection A, which provides background on the policies implicated by a pre-charge con13 Id at 11.
14 527 F3d 391 (5th Cir 2008).
15 Id at 394.

16 US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office for Victims of Crime,
Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance 9 (DOJ 2005), online at
http//www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag-guidelines.pdf (visited Aug 11, 2010).
17 Id at 29.
18 Id at 9.

410

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2010:

ferral right; subsection B, which provides examples of situations
in which the lack of a pre-charge conferral right could have an
impact on victims; subsection C, which considers the impact of
the existence of a pre-charge conferral right on defendants,
prosecutors and judges; and subsection D, which argues that the
CVRA is open to an interpretation providing for a pre-charge
conferral right.
I. THE CVRA's CONFERRAL RIGHT:
WHEN DOES IT AITACH AND WHAT IS ITS PURPOSE?
A.

The CVRA

The CVRA is an important achievement of the crime victims'
rights movement-a coalition of crime victims, victims' families,
scholars, and politicians who have advocated over the last forty
years for greater involvement and more respectful treatment of
victims in the criminal justice process. 19 The movement works
from the premise that "crimes are committed against individuals
just as much as they are against the community," 20 and has been
critical of the criminal justice system and actors within the system for inflicting a "secondary harm" on crime victims (the "primary harm" being the act of the criminal offender). 21 The movement complains that victims are too often excluded from phases
of investigation, prosecution, and court proceedings in which victims have an interest and to which their participation would be
valuable. 22 Rights advocates seek to change the process to one in
which, as a prominent academic voice in the movement has put
it:
victims follow their own case down the assembly line. Victims consult informally with police and prosecutor. At
formal proceedings, when appropriate and in an appropriate manner, victims may speak and address the court.
Victims are heard by the prosecutor and the court before

19 David E. Aaronson, New Rights and Remedies: The Federal Crime Victims' Rights
Act of 2004, 28 Pace L Rev 623, 630 (Summer 2008).
20 Jon Kyl, Steven J. Twist, and Stephen Higgins, On the Wings of Their Angels: The
Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime
Victims'Rights Act, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev 581, 583 (Fall 2005).
21 Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation
Model, 1999 Utah L Rev 289, 294 (1999).
22 Aaronson, 28 Pace L Rev at 625 (cited in note 19).
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pretrial dispositions are finalized. Victims may speak at
23
sentencing and at release hearings.
In the words of the CVRA's primary drafter, Senator Jon Kyl,
Congress enacted the CVRA in 200424 to "force a change in a
criminal justice culture which has failed to focus on the legitimate interests of crime victims." 25 To that end, the CVRA grants
eight enforceable rights to "crime victims," 26 defimed as "person[s]
directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of
a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia."2 7 The
eight rights are:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of
any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public
court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear
and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by
the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard
other testimony at that proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for
the Government in the case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in
law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect
28
for the victim's dignity and privacy.
23
24
25
26
27
28

Beloof, 1999 Utah L Rev at 296 (cited in note 21).
CVRA, 118 Stat at 2261 (2004).
150 Cong Rec S10911 (Oct 9, 2004) (statement of Sen Kyl).
18 USC § 3771(a).
18 USC § 3771(e).
18 USC § 3771(a)(1)-(8).
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The enumeration of victims' rights is nothing new. 29 In fact,
prior to the CVRA's enactment, the Victims' Rights and
Restitution Act of 1990 ("VRRA") granted victims most of the
rights enumerated in the CVRA, including the "right to confer
with [the] attorney for the Government in the case." 30 The CVRA,
although it repealed the rights-related provision of the VRRA,
which had been codified at 42 USC § 10606, merely reenacted
some rights provided by the VRRA and added others. 31 It should
be noted here parenthetically that the VRRA also included a services-related provision, enumerating services to be provided by
the government to victims of crime. The services-related portion
of the VRRA has been codified at 42 USC § 10607 and remains in
32
force.
The real novelty of the CVRA is its enforcement provisions.
Government officials involved in the detection, investigation, and
prosecution of crime are to "make their best efforts to see that
crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights" enumerated, 33 and pursuant to the statute, the Attorney General must
promulgate regulations to "enforce the rights of crime victims
and to ensure compliance by responsible officials." 34 Courts are
charged with the responsibility, "[imn any court proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim," to "ensure that the
crime victim is afforded the rights described." 35 Perhaps most
importantly, crime victims themselves-or the government or the
personal representative of the victim on the victims' behalfhave the power to assert their rights by motion during the district court's proceedings or, "if no prosecution is underway, in the
district court in the district in which the crime occurred."36 As to
this distribution of the power to assert CVRA rights, Senator Kyl
explained,
The provision also recognizes that, at times, the government's attorney may be best situated to assert a crime
victim's rights.., because, at times, the crime victim's in29 See 150 Cong Rec S4262 (Apr 22, 2004) (statement of Sen Feinstein). See also
Aaronson, 28 Pace L Rev at 626-30 (cited in note 19).
30 Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 ("VRRA"), Pub L No 101-647, 104 Stat
4820 (1990), codified at 42 USC § 10606 (2000), repealed by CVRA, 118 Stat at 2264.
31 See CVRA § 102, 118 Stat at 2264.
32 VRRA § 503, 104 Stat at 4820 (1990), codified at 42 USC § 10607 (2006).
33 18 USC § 3771(c)(1).
34 18 USC § 3771(f)(1).
35 18 USC § 3771(b)(1).
36 18 USC § 3771(d)(3). See also 18 USC § 3771(d)(1).
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terests coincide with those of the government and it
makes sense for a single person to express those joined interests. Importantly, however, the provision does not
mean that the government's attorney has the authority to
compromise or co-opt a victim's right.. . . The rights provided in this bill are personal to the individual crime victim and it is that crime victim that has the final word re37
garding which of the specific rights to assert and when.
If the crime victim is dissatisfied with the disposition of his
motion, she can petition the court of appeals for a writ of
mandamus, 38 a mechanism the drafters included because
"[w]ithout the right to seek appellate review and a guarantee
that the appellate court will hear the appeal and order relief, a
victim is left to the mercy of the very trial court that may have
erred." 39 The court of appeals is required to issue or deny the writ
within three days from the filing of the petition. 40 The circuits
are currently split as to the proper standard of review to apply to
41
the district court's decision.
A victim's remedies are limited. In no case can a new trial be
ordered for failure to provide a victim her rights. 42 The victim
can move to reopen a plea or sentence only if her right to be
heard was asserted and denied, 43 she has petitioned the court of
appeals within ten days, 44 and, "in the case of a plea, the accused
has not pled [guilty] to the highest offense charged." 45
In recognition of the CVRA's potential to put a substantial
burden on the government and the courts when the crime being
prosecuted involves a large number of victims, the drafters of the
statute provided, in a sort of safety-valve provision, that "where
the court finds that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the crime victims the rights described
... the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect

37 150 Cong Rec S10912 (statement of Sen Kyl).
38 18 USC § 3771(d)(3).
39 150 Cong Rec S10912 (statement of Sen Kyl).
40 18 USC § 3771(d)(3).
41 See Steven Joffee, Note, Validating Victims: Enforcing Victims' Rights through
Mandatory Mandamus, 2009 Utah L Rev 241, 246 (2009).
42 18 USC § 3771(d)(5).
43 18 USC § 3771(d)(5)(A).
44 18 USC § 3771(d)(5)(B).
45 18 USC § 3771(d)(5)(C).
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to [the CVRA] that does not unduly complicate or prolong the
46
proceedings."
B.

When Victims' Conferral Rights Attach
1. The Dean decision.

The Fifth Circuit, deciding on victims' mandamus appeal in
In re Dean,47 held that a victim's right to confer with the government attorney could, under certain circumstances, attach prior to the government's filing of charges. 48 The Dean victimpetitioners (victims of an explosion at a BP Products oil refinery
that resulted in fifteen dead and over 170 injured) asked the appellate court to issue a writ ordering the trial court to reject a
plea agreement reached between the government and BP
Products North America Inc. 49 The ground for the request was
that the victims' CVRA rights-namely, the right to confer with
the attorney for the government in the case and the right to be
50
treated with fairness-had been violated.
The factual basis for the victim-petitioners' claim was that,
prior to the filing of charges, the government and BP Products
had engaged in plea negotiations without consulting the victims. 5 1 Indeed, in a sealed motion to the district court prior to the
filing of charges, the government explained that it anticipated
52
reaching a plea agreement with BP Products within one week.
The government claimed that the large number of victims made
it impracticable to consult with victims prior to reaching an
agreement, and that even notifying the victims that an agreement was in the works was problematic. In particular, explained
the government, notification would result in extensive media attention to BP Products's admission of criminal responsibility,
which could "prejudice BP Products ... [,] impair the plea
negotiation process and ... prejudice the case in the event that
no plea is reached." 53 Accordingly, the government requested

46 18 USC § 3771(d)(2).
47 527 F3d 391 (5th Cir 2008).
48 Id at 394.
49 Id at 392.
50 See id; United States v BP Products North America Inc, 2008 WL 501321, *1 (SD
Tex 2008).
51 BPProducts,2008 WL 501321 at *1.
52 Id.

53 Id at *2.
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permission to inform the victims of their CVRA rights after the
54
plea agreement was signed.
In response, the district court issued a sealed order essentially adopting the government's claims as its own findings and
ordering that the victims were not to be notified of their CVRA
rights prior to execution of the plea agreement. 55 Instead, the
government was to provide notice after execution of the plea
agreement, at which time the victims would be afforded their
56
CVRA rights.
The government and BP Products signed an agreement less
than a week later; the government had filed charges under seal
in the interim. The district court later rejected the victims' claim
that their CVRA right to confer with the government had been
57
violated by this process.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed on appeal: "The district court
acknowledged that '[t]here are clearly rights under the CVRA
that apply before any prosecution is underway.' Logically, this
includes the CVRA's establishment of victims' 'reasonable right
to confer with the attorney for the Government.' '58 The Fifth
Circuit rejected the government's claim that providing notification to the victims would have been impracticable, and also rejected the contention that potential prejudice to BP Products or
impairment of the plea negotiations justified denying victims
their right to confer. 59 In the view of the court:
Congress made the policy decision-which we are bound
to enforce-that the victims have a right to inform the
plea negotiation process by conferring with prosecutors
before a plea agreement is reached. That is not an infringement, as the district court believed, on the government's independent prosecutorial discretion.., instead, it
is only a requirement that the government confer in some
reasonable way with the victims before ultimately exercis60
ing its broad discretion.
While the Fifth Circuit ultimately disagreed with the lower
court's conclusion, the reasoning that supports the appellate
54 Id.
55 See BP Products,2008 WL 501321 at *2.
56 Id.

57 See id at *3.
58 Dean, 527 F3d at 394 (alteration in original and citation omitted).
59 Id at 395 (citation omitted).
60 Id.
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court's view is set out in the district court's decision in United
States v BP Products North America Inc. The reasoning begins
by pointing to the fact that section 3771(d)(3) of the CVRA, regarding motions for relief, instructs victims that "the rights
described ... shall be asserted in the district court in which a
defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution
is underway, in the district court in the district in which the
crime occurred." 61 The BP Products court reasoned that this language implied that a victim could assert at least some CVRA
rights before the government had filed charges, 62 reasoning
63
accepted by the Fifth Circuit.
Turning to the enumerated rights themselves, the district
court noted that many are associated with certain units of a
prosecution. 64 For example, the right to notice, the right not to be
excluded, and the right to be reasonably heard are tied to "public
court proceeding[s]," 65 or "public proceeding[s]."66 In contrast,
the rights to be reasonably protected from the accused and to
be treated with fairness are not tied to specific stages of a
prosecution. 6 7 The reasonable right to confer is tied, uniquely, to
68
"the case."
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the statutory structure
combined with "logic" compelled the conclusion that the conferral
right could apply pre-charge. 69 Frankly, the court's claim to have
"carefully examined the pleadings, the thorough order of the district court, and the applicable law" notwithstanding, 70 the
reasoning of the Dean decision is not very well explained.
2.

Some authority on the point at which the conferral right
attaches.

While no other court has considered the question presented
to the Fifth Circuit in Dean, courts considering the application of
61 BPProducts,2008 WL 501321 at *11 (emphasis in original).
62 See id.
r3 Dean, 527 F3d at 394.
64 BPProducts,2008 WL 501321 at *11-12.
65 18 USC § 3771(a)(2) & (3).
66 18 USC § 3771(a)(4).
67 18 USC § 3771(a)(1) & (8). The court in United States v Rubin, 558 F Supp 2d 411,
420 (EDNY 2008), has pointed out that, having used the word "accused," the drafters of
the CVRA must have meant accused by the government.
68 18 USC § 3771(a)(5).
69 Dean, 527 F3d at 394.
70 Id.
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CVRA rights in different contexts have rendered decisions that
might inform a consideration of whether there exists a precharge conferral right in the CVRA. These decisions focus on the
term "crime victim" in the CVRA, defined for purposes of the
statute as "a person directly and proximately harmed as a result
of the commission of a Federal offense." 71 If, for purposes of the
statute, a crime victim comes into being only after charges have
been filed, then there can be no pre-charge conferral right, as
72
only "crime victims" are entitled to rights under the statute.
Noteworthy nonjudicial authorities have also made highly
relevant contributions towards clarifying the point at which the
conferral right attaches.
In United States v Turner,73 a magistrate judge wrote sua
sponte to clarify what he believed were the court's obligations to
victims under the then recently enacted CVRA. 74 Of particular
interest, the magistrate had been informed that there were
"persons harmed by... uncharged criminal conduct attributed to
75
the defendant," and he considered his obligations toward them.
The magistrate first sought to interpret the CVRA's definition of "crime victim" to avoid conflict with the presumption of
the defendant's innocence. 76 The magistrate had identified a
problem: the CVRA definition of "crime victim" asks the court to
assume one of the issues the jury is responsible for determining
once a defendant is charged-in other words, whether a federal
offense has occurred. The magistrate reconciled the presumption
of innocence with the CVRA's definition of "crime victim" by
interpreting the definition to "include any person who would be
considered a 'crime victim' if the government were to establish
77
the truth of the factual allegations in its charging instrument,"
an interpretation that seemingly precludes the conferral of
"crime victim" status on persons harmed by "uncharged" conduct.
Indeed, the magistrate noted the practical, and perhaps constitutional, problems that would be raised by a purported victim's assertion of rights in relation to "allegations of uncharged
conduct [that] will not have been tested even against the relatively low standard of probable cause . . [,] exacerbating the due
71 18 USC § 3771(e).
72

18 USC § 3771(a).

73 367 F Supp 2d 319 (EDNY 2005).
74 Id at 320.
75 Id at 326 (emphasis in original).
76 Id.
77 Turner, 367 F Supp 2d at 326.
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process problem inherent in designating a person as the defendant's 'victim.'" 78 Ultimately, however, given the posture of the
case, the magistrate had the luxury of "avoid[ing] the pitfall of
79
seeking to determine who is 'actually' a victim."
Other courts have not been afforded that choice, having been
asked to exclude persons claiming "crime-victim" status under
the CVRA. These courts have indeed looked to the conduct
underlying the offenses charged by the government to determine
whether the purported victim is due CVRA rights. 80 It appears,
however, that the victims in these cases claimed crime-victim
status only in relation to conduct underlying charges that were
filed by the government. 81 There was no call for the courts to
analyze whether the petitioners could claim crime-victim status
in relation to uncharged conduct. Consequently, inferring the
disposition of these courts toward claims of pre-charge crimevictim status may not be possible based on these decisions. Yet
the Turner analysis indicates that some courts might be unwilling to recognize purported crime victims where doing so requires
the judge to assume the commission of criminal offenses without
the support of at least a prior finding of probable cause. If so, this
means the court would not enforce CVRA rights pre-charge.
At least one court, in United States v Grace,82 has explicitly
disagreed with the Thrner court's contention that the CVRA's
definition of crime victim and the presumption of innocence are
in conflict, explaining:
It is unnecessary ... to assume that the person(s) the
government accuses of committing a federal offense in fact
did so. A court need only assume that the federal offense
alleged has occurred, and then identify, if possible, who
was directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
83
commission of the offense."

78 Id at 327.

79 Id.
80 See, for example, In re Rendon Galvis, 564 F3d 170, 175-76 (2d Cir 2009); In re
Stewart, 552 F3d 1285, 1287-88 (11th Cir 2008); United States v Grace, 597 F Supp 2d
1157, 1159 (D Mont 2009), vacated, 2009 WL 5697923 (D Mont 2009); United States v
Sharp, 463 F Supp 2d 556, 563-65 (ED Va 2006).
81 See Rendon Galvis, 564 F3d at 175-76. See also Stewart, 552 F3d at 1288-89;
Grace, 597 F Supp 2d at 1159; Sharp, 463 F Supp 2d at 557-58.
82 597 F Supp 2d 1157 (D Mont 2009).
83 Id at 1162.
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Under this interpretation, the identity of the defendant, or even
whether an offender has been identified at all, is irrelevant.
Given the posture of the case, however, the Grace court proceeded to determine whether there were identifiable victims by
"assum[ing] the commission of the federal offenses the govern84
ment allege[d] in the Superseding Indictment."
As before, inferring the Grace court's disposition towards a
claim of pre-charge crime victim status proves difficult because
the government asserted that crime victims were entitled to
recognition only in relation to the offenses charged.8 5 It is nonetheless conceivable under the Grace formulation that a court
could adjudicate a contested assertion of crime victim status in
the absence of government-filed charges and a formal probable
cause determination. It appears no court (other than the Dean
court) has done so, even where the opportunity might have
86
presented itself.
Approaching the issue from a third angle, the court in
United States v Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co8 7 explained that
the definition of "crime victim" in the CVRA is derived from the
definition of "victim" in the Victim and Witness Protection Act
88
("VWPA") and Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA").
The court made the connection between the definitions based on
a law review article authored by the primary drafter of the
CVRA and two coauthors, who explained that "[t]he CVRA's
definition of a crime victim is based on the federal restitution
statutes."8 9
Both the VWPA and MVRA have been interpreted to require
courts to look to the offense of conviction to determine the identity of victims entitled to restitution. 90 The Atlantic States
opinion concluded that a court adjudicating "crime-victim" status
under the CVRA must engage in a similar exercise. 91 The court's
reasoning suggests that the filing of charges is necessary before a
person can be classified as a crime victim entitled to CVRA
84 Id at 1163.

85 Id at 1159.
86 See, for example, Rubin, 558 F Supp 2d at 419 ("Quite understandably, movants
perceive their victimization as having begun long before the government got around the
filing the superseding indictment.").
87 612 F Supp 2d 453 (D NJ 2009).
88 Id at 460-62.
89 Id. See also Kyl, Twist, and Higgins, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 594 (cited in note

20).
90 Atlantic States, 612 F Supp 2d at 463-65.
91 Id at 469-70.
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rights. The court, however, given the postconviction posture of
the case, did not directly consider the issue of whether a person
could make a valid assertion of crime-victim status prior to
charging.
Noteworthy nonjudicial sources have also offered interpretations of who qualifies as a CVRA "crime victim" and the nature of
the entitlement provided by the conferral right. The government,
in its update of the Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and
Witness Assistance, 92 defines a CVRA "crime victim"93 as "a per-

son directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia
if the offense is charged in Federal district court."94 This
interpretation explicitly requires an offense to be actually
charged before "crime-victim" status attaches to harmed
individuals. 95 Apparently the Department of Justice is revisiting
96
this definition in light of Dean.
In contrast, in a 2005 article by the CVRA's primary drafter,
Senator Jon Kyl, and two coauthors, the authors wrote that
"most of the rights guaranteed by the CVRA apply in the context
of legal proceedings following arrest and charging," but "other
important rights are triggered by the harm inflicted by the crime
itself."97 The latter "arise without regard to the existence of legal
92 US Department of Justice, Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness
Assistance 9 (cited in note 16).
93 The Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance actually substitute the term "victim" for "crime victim." Id at 9.
94 Id (citation and quotation marks omitted). Under the Attorney General Guidelines
for Victim and Witness Assistance, a victim nevertheless must be informed of their CVRA
rights "at the earliest opportunity after detection of a crime." See id at 23. For this proposition, the Guidelines cite 18 USC § 3771(c), which requires "[o]fficers and employees of
the Department of Justice and other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime" to "make their best efforts to
see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded," their CVRA rights. Id. One might
ask how notification at the earliest opportunity after detection is possible when, for purposes of the Guidelines, a CVRA "crime victim" does not exist until the "offense is charged
in Federal district court." Id at 9.
95 It is possible that definition of "crime victim" in the Attorney General Guidelines
for Victim and Witness Assistance is intended merely to distinguish between victims of
crimes under the District of Columbia criminal code that would be tried in District of
Columbia courts, and victims of Federal crimes that would be tried in Federal district
courts. If this were the case, however, then the phrase "if the offense is chargeable in
Federal district court," would probably have been employed.
96 Government Accountability Office, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Crime Victims' Rights Act: IncreasingVictim Awareness and Clarifying Applicability to the District
of Columbia Will Improve Implementation of the Act, GAO 09-1024T 14 (GAO Sept 29,
2009), online at http/www.gao.gov/new.items/d09lO24t.pdf (visited Aug 11, 2010).
97 Kyl, Twist, and Higgins, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 594 (cited in note 20).
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proceedings." 98 To these authors, "crime victims" exist and have
enforceable CVRA rights before an offense has been charged.
However, the Justice Department, Senator Kyl, and his coauthors agree that there is no pre-charge CVRA right to confer
with the prosecutor. In fact, the source that argues most forcefully against a pre-charge conferral right is the legislative history
of the CVRA, notably the statement of the CVRA's primary
drafter, Senator Kyl, on the right to confer:
This right to confer does not give the crime victim any
right to direct the prosecution. Prosecutors should
consider it part of their profession to be available to consult with crime victims about concerns the victims may
have which are pertinent to the case, case proceedings or
dispositions. Under this provision, victims are able to confer with the Government's attorney about proceedings
after charging.99
Confirming that the statement was no slip of the tongue, Senator
Kyl again characterized the reasonable right to confer as one
that attaches "after charging" in a subsequent floor statement on
the CVRA. 10 0 Further, in 2005, Senator Kyl and two coauthors
explained: "While most of the rights guaranteed by the CVRA
apply in the context of legal proceedings following arrest and
charging, other important rights are triggered by the harm inflicted by the crime itself."10 1 As examples of the latter, the
authors listed the right to be treated with fairness, the right to
be reasonably protected from the accused, and the right to be
treated with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy. 10 2 In
contrast, with respect to the right to confer, the article quoted
Senator Kyl's floor statement (including the "after charging" lan10 3
guage) with approval.
The article explains that the conferral provision of the CVRA
is a supplement to 42 USC § 10607, enacted as part of the VRRA,
which also contained the conferral right that preceded the
CVRA. 10 4 Section 10607(c), entitled "Services to victims," pro98 Id.

99 150 Cong Rec S4268 (Apr 22, 2004) (statement of Sen Kyl) (emphasis added).
10o 150 Cong Rec S10911 (statement of Sen Kyl).
101 Kyl, Twist, and Higgins, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 594 (cited in note 20).
102 Id.
103 Id at

610.

104 In fact, the Kyl, Twist, and Higgins article says that the CVRA's conferral right is
"taken from § 10606(b)(5) of the former VRRA." Kyl, Twist, and Higgins, 9 Lewis & Clark
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vides for a series of one-way exchanges in which a "responsible
official" "inform[s]" or "notifi[es]" victims of certain events, starting at least at the point of "investigation" and continuing posttrial.10 5 According to the article, "the scope of the conferral right
is still governed by the limited notice and information provisions
of 42 USC § 10607(c), but is expanded to include consultation in
all criminal proceedings." 10 6 Thus the authors apparently envision a conferral right that is synonymous with the one-way exchanges pursuant to section 10607(c) prior to the filing of
charges, but which blooms into a two-way exchange afterwards.
This interpretation is consistent with that of the
Department of Justice. The Attorney General Guidelines explain
that the government's responsibility for providing victims with
certain information and notifications in accordance with 42 USC
§ 10607 begins with the "report of the crime and extend[s]
through the prosecution of the case."10 7 During the "investigation
stage," prior to the filing of charges, an "investigative agency" is
responsible for carrying out the government's responsibilities
under 42 USC § 10607.108 There is no mention of consultation or
conferral rights during this stage. 10 9 When charges are filed, the
"prosecution stage" commences, and the prosecutor assumes
responsibility for certain duties under 42 USC § 10607 and for
affording victims their conferral rights.1 10
C.

The Purpose and Scope of the Right to Confer

The ambiguity of the purpose and scope of the CVRA's conferral provision can be contrasted with state provisions clearly
providing that victims' conferral rights relate to "a negotiated
plea," "plea agreement," "plea bargaining," "guilty plea," or
"changing of a plea," and which make clear that the purpose of
the right is for the prosecutor to determine victims' "views,"
"opinion," or "objection" to the plea.' Also in contrast with some
state conferral provisions, the Federal provision is unclear on
L Rev at 609 (cited in note 20). See also VRRA § 503, 104 Stat at 4820, codified at 42 USC

§ 10607.
105 42 USC § 10607(c).
106 Kyl, Twist, and Higgins, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 609 (cited in note 20).
107 US Department of Justice, Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness
Assistance at 22 (cited in note 16).
108 Id.
109 Id at 22-26.
110 Id at 26-30.

Ill LaFave et al, 5 CriminalProcedure § 21.3(f) at 769-70 (cited in note 3).
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whether the prosecutor has a duty to seek out the views of
victims, or whether it is the victim who must assert his or her
right.112
The nature of the consultation between victim and prosecutor receives no elaboration in the CVRA. Nor is it clear what limits are imposed by the CVRA provision commanding, "Nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his
direction." 13 Senator Kyl, however, specifically alluded to the
interpretive provision in relation to the conferral right in his
11 4
floor statement.
Statements by CVRA sponsors indicate that they envisioned
a broad conferral right, while disclaiming any purpose to "give
the crime victim any right to direct the prosecution."1 15 According
to Senator Kyl, the "right is intended to be expansive," and includes "confer[ral] with the government concerning any critical
stage or disposition of the case," but the "right ... is not limited
to these examples."1 16 In general, "[p]rosecutors should consider
it part of their profession to be available to consult with crime
victims about concerns the victims may have which are pertinent
to the case, case proceedings or dispositions."' 1 7
The Department of Justice also views the conferral right as
relatively expansive in relation to plea negotiations under most
circumstances. Elaborating upon the victim's "reasonable right to
confer with the attorney for the Government in the case," the
Attorney General Guidelines explain that "prosecutors should be
available to consult with victims about major case decisions, such
as ... plea negotiations," 11 8 unless there is an "appropriate,
articulable reason" for not being available.' 19 The Guidelines also
112 See id at 781-82.
113 18 USC § 3771(d)(6).
114 150 Cong Rec S10911 (statement of Sen Kyl).
115 150 Cong Rec S10911 (statement of Sen Kyl).
116 Id.
117 Id. It should be noted here that plea negotiations constitute a "critical stage" when
they take place after charging, while plea negotiations that precede charging do not because the right to counsel has not yet "attached" (although courts and commentators have
denounced this result, which they nevertheless view as inevitable given the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on attachment of the right to counsel). See LaFave et al, 5 Criminal
Procedure § 21.3(a) at 695-97 (cited in note 3). Case "disposition" generally includes
reaching a plea agreement with a defendant. Black's Law Dictionary 539 (West 9th ed
2009).
118 US Department of Justice, Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness
Assistance 29 (cited in note 16).
119 Id at 8.
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instruct that a "responsible official"1 20 "should make reasonable
efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider victims' views
about, prospective plea negotiations." 121 But prosecutors should
confer only to the extent doing so is reasonable under the circumstances. 122 Factors relevant to the reasonableness determination
are:
(a) The impact on public safety and risks to personal
safety.
(b) The number of victims.
(c) Whether time is of the essence in negotiating or entering a proposed plea.
(d) Whether the proposed plea involves confidential information or conditions.
(e) Whether there is another need for confidentiality.
(f) Whether the victim is a possible witness in the case
and the effect that relaying any information may have on
123
the defendant's right to fair trial.
As for the courts, the Dean court viewed the conferral right
expansively, holding that it required prosecutors to "ascertain
the victims' views on the possible details of a plea bargain" before
ultimately exercising their discretion to enter into a plea agree12 4
ment, though not necessarily before entering into negotiations.
The court dismissed the assertion that requiring prosecutors to
consult the victims violated the CVRA's command that "[n]othing
in [the CVRA] shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his
direction." 125 The court viewed the conferral process and the
prosecutor's exercise of discretion to enter into a plea agreement
120 Id at 26. The "responsible official" during the "prosecution stage" is generally the
US Attorney for the district.
121 Id at 30 (again, unless there is an "appropriate, articulable reason" for not doing
so).
122 US Department of Justice, Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness
Assistance at 27, 29-30 (cited in note 16).
123 Id at 30.

124 Dean, 527 F3d at 394-95 ("[The victims should have been notified of the ongoing
plea discussions and should have been allowed to communicate meaningfully with the
government, personally or through counsel, before a deal was struck.") (emphasis added).
125 18 USC § 3771(d)(6).
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as separate events, connected only by the possibility that the conferral process would inform (not interfere with or limit) the
126
ultimate exercise of discretion.
The court's decision in United States v Heaton127 also
suggests a broad conferral right in relation to plea bargaining,
although the issue was not before the court. In the case, the
prosecutor filed a motion to dismiss a charge against a defendant
charged with enticing a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity.1 28 The court refused to grant the motion until the government had submitted a document "recount[ing] the victim's views
on the dismissal." 129 The court explained that "the crime victims'
right to be treated with fairness and dignity applies ... broadly
to all aspects of the criminal justice system-including the
court's decision whether to grant the government's motion to
dismiss." 130 According to the court, "the only way to protect the
victim's right to be treated fairly and with respect for her dignity
is to consider the victim's views on the dismissal." 131 The court
said the conferral right served as a "convenient mechanism,"
enabling the court to learn the victim's views from the prosecutor
after the prosecutor conferred with the victim. 132
The court explained that it imposed the duty to confer on the
prosecutor because of the court's own duty to consider the victim's views before granting the government's motion to dismiss. 133 It should be noted, however, that the CVRA makes no
distinction between the duties owed to victims by courts and
prosecutors. Any duty the court imputes to itself should fall
equally on the prosecutor, independently of the court making the
prosecutor the court's instrument for relaying the victim's views.
Although victims' conferral rights in relation to plea bargaining were not at issue in Heaton, the decision has interesting
implications for the conferral right for at least two reasons. 134
First, its reasoning can be readily extended from the context in
126 See Dean, 527 F3d at 395.
127 458 F Supp 2d 1271 (D Utah 2006).
128 Id at 1271.
129 Id at 1273.

130 Heaton, 458 F Supp 2d at 1272.
131 Id.
132 Id at 1273.
133

Id.
134 Incidentally, the decision is also interesting for a third reason-it connects the
right to confer with the right to be treated with fairness, the latter right said to exist
priorto charging even by those who have said the right to confer itself does not. See Kyl,
Twist, and Higgins, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 594 (cited in note 20).
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which the judge considers granting a motion to dismiss to the
context in which the judge decides to accept or reject a plea
agreement. That is, if a CVRA provision did not already provide
victims with the right to speak directly to the court before the
judge accepts a plea agreement, 135 a court following the logic of
Heaton would impose on the prosecutor the affirmative duty to
report the victim's views on the plea agreement to the court before the court passed judgment on it.136
Second, the decision can be read to place an affirmative duty
on judges and prosecutors to consult with victims before agreeing
to a case disposition. Even though victims do have the right to
speak directly to the court at plea proceedings, the presence of a
mechanism allowing the court to perform its duty toward victims
without the aid of prosecutors does not alleviate prosecutors of
their independent duty to consider victims' views before entering
into plea agreements. Under the CVRA, the obligations of courts
and prosecutors towards victims are not meaningfully distinguishable: courts are to ensure crime victims are afforded their
rights;1 37 prosecutors are responsible for making their best efforts to accord the same rights. 3 8 If the court cannot respect the
victim without hearing his or her views before accepting a plea,
then it follows that a prosecutor cannot respect the victim without hearing his or her views before executing a plea agreement. 139 In sum, the right to confer (at least when the right
is viewed in conjunction with the victim's right to be treated
with fairness) provides the victim with a substantial opportunity
to inform the prosecutor's thinking with regard to plea
negotiations.
In contrast to the Dean and Heaton courts, other courts have
stressed the limits of the right to confer. For example, the Second

135 18 USC 3771(a)(4).
136 In fact, the court would undoubtedly have more reason, since it has greater discretion to reject a plea agreement than to reject a prosecutor's request to dismiss.
Compare Wright and Leipold, IA FederalPractice& Procedure:Criminal§ 171 at 152-53
(cited in note 8) (entering a plea), with Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King, and Susan R.
Klein, 3B Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal §§ 811-12 at 317, 326 (West 3d ed
2004) (dismissal by prosecution).
137 18 USC § 3771(b)(1).
138 18 USC § 3771(c)(1).
139 The Heaton court also imposed the obligation of reaching out on the prosecutor, not
the victim. This seemingly makes the conferral right (at least when coupled with the
right to be treated with fairness) broader than the CVRA sponsors intended it to be. The
sponsors intended for prosecutors merely to "be available" to victims. 150 Cong Rec
S 10911 (statement of Sen Kyl).
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Circuit in In re WR. Huff Asset Management14o explained:
"Nothing in the CVRA requires the Government to seek approval
from crime victims before negotiating or entering into a settlement agreement. The CVRA requires only that the court provide
41
victims with an opportunity to be heard."'
It is not clear whether the Second Circuit meant this statement to be consistent with a conferral right in relation to plea
bargaining. All authorities would agree with the WR. Huff court
that the conferral right does not give crime victims veto power
over the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. This understanding
of the conferral right, however, is not inconsistent with the idea
that prosecutors have some degree of obligation towards a victim
seeking to confer. Indeed the court in WR. Huff noted that "no
petitioner has alleged that it asked the Government to confer
with it and was denied the opportunity to do so,"1 42 indicating
that its analysis might have been different if that was in fact the
allegation.
On the other hand, the court's statement could be read to
imply that the conferral right is rendered unnecessary by the
victim's right to speak to the court during proceedings related to
a plea. If that is the proper reading of the decision, then a victim's right to influence the plea negotiation process-as opposed
to merely requesting that the judge accept or reject the plea
agreement after it has gained substantial momentum-is nonexistent.
II. AN ARGUMENT FOR A PRE-CHARGE CONFERRAL RIGHT
IN RELATION TO PLEA NEGOTIATIONS

In the words of the primary drafter of the CVRA, "[w]hen a
case is resolved through a plea bargain without the victim's
knowledge or participation, a grave injustice has been committed
by the authorities."1 43 In accordance with this vision, this
Comment argues that, as a matter of policy, the conferral right
should attach to pre-charge plea bargaining, and that, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, finding a pre-charge conferral
right in the CVRA is defensible.

140 409 F3d 555 (2d Cir 2005).
141 Id at 564 (emphasis added).
142 Id. It should be noted that the government was apparently operating under special
"multiple crime victim" procedures. Id at 559.
143 Kyl, Twist, and Higgins, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 602 (cited in note 20).
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Despite the CVRA's lack of clarity respecting the purpose of
the "reasonable right to confer," the weight of authority points to
the conclusion that victims of crime have the right to confer with
prosecutors before they reach a plea agreement with a defendant,
so long as charges have already been filed. The precise contours
of the right are more difficult to identify, but the current policy of
the Department of Justice provides that prosecutors "should
notify identified victims of, and consider victims' views about,
prospective plea negotiations," so long as doing so is not unreasonable in the sense of posing a safety risk, being logistically impracticable, undermining the negotiations themselves, threaten144
ing the need for confidentiality, or prejudicing the defendant.
Much less clear is whether victims possess a conferral right prior
to the prosecutor's filing of charges.
This Comment takes the position that a victim's right to express his views to the prosecutor with regard to a prospective
plea agreement should not be predicated on the timing of plea
negotiations. Giving victims a pre- and post-charge conferral
right eliminates the prospect of victims being arbitrarily deprived of the right to confer, and is therefore more consistent
with the purpose of the CVRA to treat victims with dignity and
respect. Supplying a pre-charge conferral right also goes some
distance toward closing a loophole that would allow a "prosecutor
to [sic] busy to care enough" to avoid having to consult victims by
1 45
choosing to negotiate a plea before filing charges.
That said, there is significant force pushing against an
interpretation of the CVRA that provides for a pre-charge conferral right, namely statements of the drafters of the CVRA
indicating that the right to confer is more limited in scope. 146
The discussion begins in subsection A with a brief background of the purported value of the conferral right in relation to
plea bargaining. Subsection B provides some examples of instances in which the lack of a pre-charge conferral right could
have adverse consequences for victims. The consequences of a
pre-charge conferral right from the standpoint of defendants,
prosecutors and judges are addressed and put in perspective in
subsection C.

144 US Department of Justice, Attorney General Guidelines for Vwctim and Witness
Assistance at 30 (cited in note 16).
115 150 Cong Rec S4262 (statement of Sen Feinstein). See also Stephen J. Schulhofer,
The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble with Us, 105 Yale L J 825, 847-48 (Dec 1995).
146 150 Cong Rec S10912 (statement of Sen Kyl).
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This Comment, however, does not seek to fully reexplore the
merits or demerits of entitling victims of crime to consult with
prosecutors respecting plea agreements, matters which have
been discussed elsewhere. 14 7 Rather, it is taken as given that
Congress has decided to grant victims this right (while acknowledging the ambiguity of the right's scope) in order to remedy a
perceived deficit in the prosecutor's performance of his duty to do
148
justice for all, including the victim.
Subsection D defends an interpretation of the CVRA that
does not permit the timing of plea negotiations to deprive victims
of the conferral right.
A.

The Case for a Victim's Right to Confer with the Prosecutor
in Relation to Plea Negotiations

Figures in the victims' rights movement have long advocated
for increased victim involvement in the process that produces
negotiated guilty pleas. 149 While some have argued that the victim's right to speak to the court at the plea hearing is adequate
protection of victims' interests,1 50 others have argued for the
right to consult with the prosecutor in relation to the negotiation
of a guilty plea.15 1 The latter commentators have argued that the
plea hearing is a point in time at which "the plea agreement has
already gained considerable momentum," making the victim's
voice less effective. 152 Thus the value of victim participation at
plea and sentencing hearings may prove illusory in those cases
when the disposition of a case is effectively predetermined by the
153
terms of a plea agreement.
Advocates of a consultation requirement argue that it improves the criminal justice system in a number of ways. Consultation can promote a victim's acceptance of the outcome of his
case-even when the victim disagrees with the outcome on sub147 See, for example, OTear, 91 Marq L Rev at 323-24 (cited in note 6); Sarah N.
Welling, Victim Participationin PleaBargains,65 Wash U L Q 301, 305-06 (1987).
148 150 Cong Rec S 4262 (statement of Sen Feinstein) (noting a "dramatic disparity
between the rights of defendants in our constitution and laws, and the rights of crime
victims and their families" in order "to illustrate that our government, and our criminal
justice system, can and should care about both the rights of accused and the rights of
victims").
149 See O'Hear, 91 Marq L Rev at 323, 326 (cited in note 6); Welling, 65 Wash U L Q at
302 (cited in note 147).
150 Welling, 65 Wash U L Q at 346-47 (cited in note 147).
151 See O'Hear, 91 Marq L Rev at 324 (cited in note 6).
152 Id.
153 See id.
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stantive grounds-so long as he is given a voice, and treated with
fairness, care, dignity, and respect. 154 Ultimately, a consultation
requirement may improve perceptions of the fairness of the
criminal justice process and the rule of law throughout society at
large.' 55 On a more practical level, victims have an interest in
restitution awards and in case disposition, 15 6 and these interests
should not be ignored. Victims sometimes possess important
information (perhaps even exculpatory information) that should
be known by the parties to the plea negotiations. 15 7 This information may speak to the defendant's guilt or innocence, or it may
be useful in determining a proper sentence to recommend to the
court. 15 8 Finally, victims' rights advocates see consultation as a
good on its own terms, as a process that vindicates the "value of
159
the victim."
According to the Attorney General Guidelines, victims of
crime do not have the right to confer with the prosecutor before
charges have been filed against the defendant.'6 0 This is a gap in
the scheme for giving victims conferral rights. A victim's interest
in consulting with the prosecutor when a pre-charge plea agreement is negotiated is the same as when an agreement is
negotiated post-charge. The pre-charge/post-charge distinction is
arbitrary from the perspective of the victim, and inconsistent
with the purpose of the CVRA to provide "[flair play for crime
victims, meaningful participation of crime victims in the justice
system [and] protection against a government that would take
16 1
from a crime victim the dignity of due process."
B.

Situations in Which Victims May Be Denied the Conferral
Right Because Plea Negotiations Take Place Before Charges
Are Filed

It is not uncommon for prosecutors and defendants to opt to
bargain over a plea pre-charge rather than post-charge, perhaps
154 Id at 326-27.
155 See O'Hear, 91 Marq L Rev at 328 (cited in note 6).

156 See Welling, 65 Wash U L Q at 307 (cited in note 147).
157 See O'Hear, 91 Marq L Rev at 328 (cited in note 6).
158 Id at 328-29.
159 Id at 330, quoting Jean Hampton, CorrectingHarms Versus Righting Wrongs: The
Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L Rev 1659, 1686 (1992). See also Susan E. Gegan and
Nicholas E. Rodriguez, Victims' Roles in the CriminalJustice System: A Fallacy of Victim
Empowerment?, 8 St John's J Legal Comm 225, 236-37 (1992).
160 US Department of Justice, Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness
Assistance at 9 (cited in note 16).
161 150 Cong Rec S4264 (statement of Sen Kyl).
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incidentally or intentionally denying a victim the conferral right.
Pre-charge plea bargaining can occur because the filing of
charges constrains prosecutors and defendants under the US
Sentencing Guidelines, 162 which remain influential despite their
advisory status.' 63 Prosecutors and defendants know that because the Guidelines favor sentencing based upon an "offender's
real conduct," in many cases the judge will consider the conduct
underlying all of the charges in fashioning the defendant's sentence, even if some of the charges themselves have been dropped
through plea bargaining. 64 To avoid bringing the conduct of the
defendant to the attention of the court, and thereby increase
bargaining flexibility, the parties may opt to bargain prior to the
filing of charges. At this time, "the prosecutor may be more
flexible ... because no formal position on a charge has yet been
taken;" internal review procedures are less onerous than for
dropping a charge already filed; and facts that may be disadvantageous to the defendant have not yet emerged. 165 However, the
crime victim's interest in bringing her concerns and information
to the attention of the prosecutor will be undermined by this process if there is no pre-charge conferral right in the CVRA.
As noted in the introduction to this Comment, essentially all
white collar criminal plea bargaining occurs pre-charge. Without
a pre-charge conferral right, white collar crime victims will be
completely deprived of the right to express their views to the
prosecutor.
C.

The Consequences of a Pre-Charge Conferral Right from
Various Criminal Justice Perspectives

Of course, victims are not the only actors with interests in
the criminal justice system. Victims' rights also have an impact
on defendants, judges and prosecutors.
There are reasonable arguments for denying victims the
right to confer in relation to plea negotiations, all animated by
the idea that the right undermines the proper roles of other figures in the criminal justice system. 166 Thus it has been argued
162 LaFave et al, 5 CriminalProcedure § 21.1(h) at 554-57 (cited in note 3).
163 See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors,and the Exercise of
Discretion, 117 Yale L J 1420, 1495-96 (2008).
164 See LaFave et al, 5 Criminal Procedure § 21.1(h) at 558 (cited in note 3), citing
United States v Booker, 543 US 220 (2005).
165 LaFave et al, 5 CriminalProcedure § 21.1(h) at 557 (cited in note 3).
166 For a discussion of potential problems with the CVRA regime generally, see Erin
C. Blondel, Victims' Rights in an Adversary System, 58 Duke L J 237 (2008).
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that it is "unwise to confuse the prosecutor's function [to represent society] by obliging him or her to consider the victim's
interests." 167 It has also been said that victims' rights may contribute to ethical lapses by prosecutors at the expense of defendants. 168 A consultation requirement may hinder the efficiency
with which prosecutors negotiate pleas.1 69 A victims' rights re170
gime that gives standing to victims may lead to novel litigation
that strains judicial resources. It also can put judges in the awkward position of vindicating victims' rights despite what
prosecutors and defendants regard as their best interests. 17 1 The
benefits of the victim's right to confer are not won costlessly, and
some may wonder if they are worth the potential losses.
Arguments pointing to the costs of victims' rights, however,
challenge the wisdom of providing victims the "reasonable right
to confer" (and sometimes the wisdom of the broader victims'
rights regime) in toto. They do not speak to the question of why
the interests of defendants, prosecutors, and judges would be
weightier or more deeply harmed pre-charge as opposed to postcharge. It is worth considering here whether providing the right
to confer in the pre-charge context promises to be significantly
more costly than doing so after charges have been filed.
1.

A pre-charge conferral right's consequences for the
defendant.

It is not clear that a pre-charge conferral right conflicts with
the defendant's rights, provided that a post-charge conferral
right already exists. The argument that judicial recognition of
"crime victims" prior to charging is in conflict with the presumption of innocence does not stand up to scrutiny. First, as the
Grace court argued, to determine the identities of CVRA crime
victims, a court only needs to assume that a Federal offense has
occurred.1 72 The court does not need to make assumptions
respecting the identity of the person who committed the offense,
at least no more than it must do so after charges are filed and

167 Welling, 65 Wash U L Q at 346-47 (cited in note 147).
168 See Bennett L. Gershman, ProsecutorialEthics and Victims' Rights: The Prosecutor's Duty of Neutrality, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev 559, 570-72 (2005).
169 See Gegan and Rodriguez, 8 St John's J Legal Comm at 232-33 (cited in note 161).
170 See generally United States v Rubin, 558 F Supp 2d 411 (EDNY 2008).
171 See Blondel, 58 Duke L J at 260-62 (cited in note 166).
172 Grace, 597 F Supp 2d at 1161-62.
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before a jury decides guilt or innocence, as is now routinely done
173
under the CVRA.
Second, the major protection afforded to the defendant by
the presumption of innocence is achieved by putting the burden
of proving the defendant's guilt on the government and by guiding the factfinder in the weighing of evidence at trial. 174 It is
hard to see how recognizing "crime victims" before charges are
filed would make it more difficult for the court to ensure the
presumption of innocence protects the defendant in these
ways-again, provided that a post-charge conferral right already
175
exists.
Third, as with all CVRA rights accorded to victims, the corresponding duties directly fall on the court and the government,
not the defendant. If the court and government managed their
dual obligations to the defendant and the victim ineffectively or
unfairly, certainly the defendant would be injured. However,
there is no reason why the risk of ineffective or unfair balancing
of interests is heightened before charging as opposed to after.
2.

A pre-charge conferral right's consequences for the
prosecutor.

As for prosecutors, they currently make a case-by-case reasonableness determination respecting the appropriateness of
affording victims conferral rights after charging. 176 It is not clear
why doing the same before charging would be so fundamentally
different as to warrant a per se rule against conferral.
A larger challenge is posed by the prospect of pre-charge
litigation initiated by a person purporting to be a victim and
challenging the government's refusal to confer. For example, the
government might contest the person's victim status; contest the
person's claim that there is a prosecutor for the government in
the case; or simply feel it would not be reasonable to consult with
the person even though the person is a victim and the prosecution is engaged in plea bargaining. If such litigation were initiat-

Id.
174 22A CJS Criminal Law § 959 (2010).
175 Compare Sierra Elizabeth, The Newest Spectator Sport: Why Extending Victims'
Rights to the Spectators' Gallery Erodes the Presumption of Innocence, 58 Duke L J 275
(2008) (arguing that defendants can be prejudiced by the presence of victims' families in
the spectator gallery during trial).
176 US Department of Justice, Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness
Assistance at 30 (cited in note 16).
173
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ed, circumstances can be imagined in which it could pose a threat
to the secrecy of an ongoing investigation.
It is likely, however, that this threat is largely theoretical.
On a general level, it is probably the rare case in which the victim seeks to undermine the investigative efforts of the government without a compelling reason. 177 Even if victims were wont
to more aggressively challenge the government, the likelihood of
a victim interfering with an investigation by way of instituting a
pre-charge proceeding pursuant to 18 USC § 3771(d)(3) is low. If
the circumstances surrounding the Dean case are any guide, the
case in which a victim is aware that prosecutors are engaged in
pre-charge plea negotiations without her input will be exceedingly rare. In Dean, the victims were intensely interested in the
government's prosecution efforts, 178 yet were unaware of the government's negotiations with BP Products. As in Dean, victims
will most likely find out about negotiations after the fact when
court proceedings are already underway. The victim's claim, if
meritorious, will only have the effect of increasing the scrutiny
with which the judge considers a proposed plea agreement-an
unsatisfactory remedy from the victim's standpoint, no doubt,
but one that could, over time, provide the government with the
incentive to seriously consider the interest in of the victim in
plea negotiations. In sum, it is not likely that investigations will
suffer'from victims' interference as a result of a pre-charge conferral right, as victims have neither the desire nor the means to
interfere.
3.

A pre-charge conferral right's consequences for the
judge.

Judges could also be put in a more difficult position by a precharge conferral right. The pre-charge/post-charge distinction
provides a bright-line rule-the victim asking the court to
enforce her right to confer before charges have been filed is out of
luck, even if the prosecutor and defendant engage in plea
negotiations.
Recognizing a pre-charge conferral right would replace the
bright-line rule with at least two questions that are more difficult to answer before charges are filed than after: (1) is the
177 Even assuming individuals were so disposed, presumably a court could use its
inherent authority to discourage frivolous claims. See generally Chambers v NASCO Inc,
501 US 32 (1991).
178 US v BP ProductsNorth America Inc, 610 F Supp 2d 655, 726 (SD Tex 2009).
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person asserting the violation of the reasonable right to confer
a "crime victim" for purposes of the CVRA, and (2) is there a
"prosecutor for the government in the case"?
The idea that there could be disputes as to the identity of
victims is hardly novel. The Advisory Committee Notes to the
2008 amendment of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure contemplate that "[u]pon occasion, disputes may arise
over the question whether a particular person is a [CVRA crime]
victim. Although the rule makes no special provision for such
cases, the courts have the authority to do any necessary fact finding and make any necessary legal rulings."' 79 To resolve these
disputes, courts generally determine whether the purported
harm suffered by the person claiming crime victim status was
directly related to the conduct underlying the offenses alleged in
180
the charging instrument.
Without a charging instrument, the fact finder determining
whether a victim is entitled to confer with a prosecutor would
have to find a substitute basis upon which to establish whether a
federal offense had occurred and that there was a prosecutor in
the case. Were a purported "crime victim" to assert that she was
denied the right to confer with the government regarding plea
negotiations, the court presumably would have to ask the
prosecution whether it indeed had engaged in negotiations and,
if so, to state the criminal conduct underlying the negotiations.
Based on this information, the court could proceed to determine
whether the purported victim was "directly and proximately
harmed" by the conduct underlying the offenses being bargained
over.181
The procedural posture of such a case would be irregular.
The court in United States v Rubin alluded to the difficulty and
danger in deciding when the CVRA duties of the government
arise before charges are filed:

[The realm of cases in which the CVRA might apply despite no prosecution being "underway," cannot be read to
include the victims of uncharged crimes that the government has not even contemplated. It is impossible to expect
the government, much less a court, to notify crime victims
of their rights if the government has not verified to at
179

FRCrP, App Rule 1, Advisory Committee Notes (2008).

180

See, for example, Rendon Galvis, 564 F3d at 175-76; Stewart, 552 F3d at 1287-88;

Grace, 597 F Supp 2d at 1159; Sharp, 463 F Supp 2d at 563-65.
191 18 USC § 3771(e).
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least an elementary degree that a crime has actually
18 2
taken place.
Indeed the CVRA is not a mechanism for the courts to force
prosecution on the government based on the allegations of an
aggrieved individual;1 8 3 in all but extraordinary cases the separation of powers precludes this.18 4 Rather, the CVRA attaches the
conferral right only to those cases in which a federal offense has
occurred and it can be said that there is a prosecutor pursuing
the case.
The court need not overstep its institutional bounds, however, if it bases its assumption that a federal offense has
occurred and its determination that there is "an attorney for the
government in the case" on the fact that the government's
prosecutor is engaged in negotiations with a defendant regarding
charges of which the government is convinced the defendant is
guilty. The court should have no difficulty thus equating plea
negotiations with the filing of charges, considering the United
States Attorney's Manual (USAM) requires prosecutors to have
an adequate factual basis for the charges in relation to which
they seek a conviction at trial, or to which a defendant will be
asked to plead, whether pre- or post-charge.185
If indeed the prosecutor is engaged in pre-charge plea bargaining, he should possess no shortage of information with which
to help assist the judge decide whether there is a CVRA "crime
victim" who is being deprived of her conferral right. The
prosecutor who chooses to initiate prosecution by engaging in
pre-charge plea bargaining must know the charge or charges he
is bargaining over in order to have the defendant plead guilty to
"the most serious readily provable charge [or charges] consistent
182 Rubin, 558 F Supp 2d at 419.
183 18 USC 3771(d)(6).
184 See Inmates of Attica CorrectionalFacility v Rockefeller, 477 F2d 375, 379 (2d Cir

1973).
185 See US Department of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual 9-27.300 (DOJ
2007), online at http /www.justice.gov/usao/eouss/foiareading_roon/usam/ (visited Aug
11, 2010) ("[O]nce the decision to prosecute has been made, the attorney for the government should charge, or should recommend that the grand jury charge, the most serious
offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct, and that is likely to
result in a sustainable conviction."); id at 9-27.330 ("Before filing or recommending charges pursuant to a precharge plea agreement, the attorney for the government should consult the plea agreement provisions of USAM 9-27.430, thereof, relating to the selection of
charges to which a defendant should be required to plead guilty."); id at 9-27.430(A)
("[The defendant should be required to plead to a charge or charges: 1. That is the most
serious readily provable charge consistent with the nature and extent of his/her criminal
conduct; 2. That has an adequate factual basis.").
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with the nature and extent of [the defendant's] criminal conduct." 186 Prosecutors at this stage can also be expected to know
the factual basis (including information respecting victims) for
the charges being bargained over, since the plea agreement must
have an adequate factual basis 187 and because prosecutors are
supposed to consider the effect of a plea on the "victim's right to
restitution" prior to entering into negotiations.18 8 With the help
of the prosecutor, the court should be well-equipped to make the
necessary determinations.
While the procedural posture for determining pre-charge
CVRA rights is exceptional, resolution of the relevant issues
merely requires the court to engage in a somewhat novel form of
factfinding. It should also be repeated that it is unlikely that a
court will often be asked to adjudicate these matters since even
the attentive victim will be in a poor position to know whether or
not the government is engaged in plea bargaining.
D.

As a Matter of Statutory Interpretation, It Is Reasonable to
Find a Pre-charge Conferral Right in the CVRA
1.

"Crime victims" exist pre-charge under the CVRA.

An interpretation of the CVRA that does not make the conferral right depend on the government's filing of charges builds
on a number of points that have already been made by courts. It
begins with the observation that the CVRA contemplates the
existence of "crime victims" prior to the government filing charges.' 8 9 That is, because "[olfficers and employees of the
Department of Justice and other departments and agencies of
the United States engaged in the detection, investigation, or
prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that
crime victims are notified of, and afforded, [their CVRA]
rights,"190 the statute seems to envision the existence of "crime
victims" during the stages of detection and investigation of
crime, in addition to during the prosecution stage. Likewise, because crime victims are given the power to assert CVRA rights
"in the district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for
the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court
186 Id at 9-27.430(A). See also id at 9-27.330 (providing guidelines for engaging in precharge plea bargaining).
187 Id at 9-27.430(A).
188 Id at 9-27.420(A)(12).
189 See Dean, 527 F3d at 394.
190 18 USC § 3771(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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in the district in which the crime occurred,"1 91 there must
be "crime victims" to assert their rights when no prosecution is
underway.
Familiar canons of statutory interpretation urge courts to
avoid interpreting one provision of a statute inconsistently with
the policies or necessary assumptions of other provisions. 192 The
CVRA definition of "crime victim" relates the harm of a purported victim to the "commission of a Federal offense," 193 which
might at first be thought synonymous with charges alleged or
qproven by the government. However, to be consistent with the
policies and assumptions of other CVRA provisions, whether or
not the "commission of a Federal offense" has occurred must not
be conditioned upon the filing of charges. The CVRA definition of
"crime victim" must be squared with the policy of the "enforcement" and "best efforts" provisions quoted above to recognize
crime victims prior to the filing of charges.
Courts have suggested arguments for limiting "crime-victim"
status to those persons who have been harmed by charged conduct, but these are unpersuasive. The weakness of an interpretation of the CVRA that seeks to avoid conflict with the presumption of innocence has already been addressed.
Similarly unpersuasive is the argument that the definition
of "crime victim" requires the filing of charges because the definition of the term has been borrowed from the VWPA' 94 and
MVRA,195 statutes under which courts determine victim status
by looking to the charges of conviction. 196 To begin with, the
claim that the CVRA's definition of "crime victim" is based on the
definition of "victim" in the restitution statutes was not made in
the legislative chambers. Rather, it was made in a law review
article subsequent to the passage of the CVRA,1 97 and thus
its persuasive force as legislative history should be discounted
accordingly.
More importantly, while the interpretation given to the
restitution statutes can certainly inform the interpretation given
to the CVRA, it can do so only to a degree. The restitution
statutes define "victim," in relevant part, as "a person directly
191
192
193
194

18 USC § 3771(d)(3).
Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.05 (West 6th ed 2000).
18 USC § 3771(e).
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 USC § 3663 (2006).
195 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 USC § 3663A (2006).
196 See Atlantic States, 612 F Supp 2d at 460-62.
197 See Kyl, Twist, and Higgins, 9 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 594 (cited in note 20).
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and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an
offense for which restitution may be ordered," 198 whereas "crime
victim" in the CVRA means a "person directly and proximately
harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense." 199
The "directly and proximately harmed" language is in fact identical in the restitution statutes and the CVRA, and interpretation
of the language in the former may indeed serve as a "helpful
guide" for interpreting the meaning of the same language in the
latter. 200 However, the restitution statutes will not be helpful in
determining the meaning of "the commission of a Federal
offense," which is the language that matters to the question of
whether there is a pre-charge conferral right. In the restitution
statutes, "the commission of an offense" means the offense of
conviction.20 1 If the CVRA is to have any effect at all, "the commission of a Federal offense" must refer to something other than
the offense of conviction. The restitution statutes are unhelpful
for determining what that something is.
Seeking guidance to the meaning of "victim" or "crime victim" in other parts of the Federal Code is likewise unhelpful. The
victims' rights statutes in the Code are inconsistent when it
comes to fixing the point at which victim status attaches. In
general, the meaning of "victim" or "crime victim" in the various
statutes depends heavily on the purpose of the respective
202
legislation.
However, reading the CVRA in pari materiawith the statute
that is arguably the CVRA's most relevant analogue indicates
that crime victim status should not be conditioned on the filing of
charges. The statute is 42 USC § 10607, enacted as part of the
VRRA. Also enacted as part of the VRRA was the section later
codified at 42 USC § 10606, the predecessor of the CVRA, which
the CVRA repealed. 20 3 The predecessor and successor statutes
20 4
substantially overlap in the rights they provide crime victims.
198 18 USC §§ 3663(a)(2) and 3663A(a)(2).
199 18 USC § 3771(e).
200 Sharp, 463 F Supp 2d at 562.
201

Id.

202 In addition to the restitution statutes and VRRA, see the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, Pub L No 97-291, 96 Stat 1248; Victims of Crime Act of 1984,
Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 2170, codified at 42 USC § 10601 (2006); Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 1796; Victim Rights
Clarification Act of 1997, Pub L No 105-6, 111 Stat 4820, codified as amended at 18 USC
§ 3510 (2000).
203 VRRA § 502, 104 Stat 4820, codified at 42 USC § 10606, repealed by the CVRA,
118 Stat 2261 (2004).
204 Compare 42 USC § 10606, repealed by the CVRA, 118 Stat 2261 (2004), with 18
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Indeed, 42 USC § 10606 granted to victims a conferral right
20 5
identical to that contained in the CVRA.
It is reasonable to read the CVRA and VRRA in pari materia
given their similar subject matter and the contemporaneous passage of what later became 42 USC 88 10606 and 10607.206
Reading the statutes parallel to each other reveals the following.
In 42 USC § 10607, "victim" means "a person that has suffered
direct physical, emotional, or pecuniary harm as a result of the
commission of a crime." 20 7 In context, the CVRA's "commission of
a Federal offense" is not meaningfully different from § 10607's
"the commission of a crime" other than the latter being more
comprehensive (presumably including victims of crimes that
have not yet been determined to be Federal in nature). Yet, in
stark contrast to the use of the term in the restitution statutes,
the definition of "victim" in 42 USC § 10607 necessarily contemplates the existence of "victims" not only prior to conviction but
also prior to charging. 20 8 That is, no conviction or even a charging
instrument needs to be in place before it can be said there has
been "the commission of a crime" for purposes of 42 USC § 10607.
The services to be afforded victims by the government under the
statute are rendered beginning with the investigation of the
20 9
crime itself.
The argument for looking to 42 USC § 10607 to inform the
meaning of "crime victim" in the CVRA might have been stronger
had the definition of "victim" in the VRRA not been limited to the

section that later became 42 USC § 10607.210 Unhelpfully, "crime
victim" was undefined in what became 42 USC § 10606, although
it should be noted that 42 USC § 10607 cross-references the former 42 USC § 10606 in a way that arguably makes "victim" in
211
the latter synonymous with "crime victim" in the former.

USC § 3771(a).
205 42 USC § 10606, repealed by the CVRA, 118 Stat 2261 (2004).
206 Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction §8 51.1-51.3 (West 7th ed 2008).
207 42 USC § 10607(e).
208 See 42 USC § 10607(b)(1) ("At the earliest opportunity after the detection of a
crime at which it may be done without interfering with an investigation, a responsible
official shall identify the victim or victims of a crime.").
209 42 USC § 10607(c)(3).
210 42 USC § 10607(e).
211 42 USC § 10607(c)(3)(D) ("During the investigation and prosecution of a crime, a
responsible official shall provide a victim the earliest possible notice of the scheduling of
each court proceeding that the witness is either required to attend or, under section
10606(b)(4) of this title, is entitled to attend.").

407]

THE RIGHT TO CONFER UNDER THE CVRA

441

Regardless, the point is simply that it is difficult to understand why Congress would have conceived of crime victims
differently in the sections of the VRRA that became 42 USC
§§ 10606 and 10607. It probably did not. Since there is no
indication Congress intended the CVRA to be narrower than 42
USC § 10606, an interpreter should look to 42 USC § 10607 to
inform the meaning of the CVRA. Since victims under 42 USC
§ 10607 necessarily exist pre-charge, this opens up the possibility
that they exist at that point under the CVRA as well. The fact
that provisions of the CVRA seem to contemplate the existence of
pre-charge crime victims increases the probability that this is
indeed the correct interpretation of the statute.
2.

A "case" does not require the filing of charges under the
CVRA.

Of course, even if there is such thing as a CVRA "crime victim" prior to the government's filing of charges, it would not
matter for the sake of the victim's conferral right if, by keying
the conferral right to "the case,"2 12 Congress limited the right to
the post-charge context. A "case" is commonly defined as a "civil
or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy at law or in
equity," 213 a definition that would seem, in the criminal context,
to require charges filed by the government. But it is not clear the
CVRA uses "case" in this sense. Case could be used in the statute
in its more general sense as "a specific occurrence or matter requiring discussion, decision, or investigation, as by officials or
214
law-enforcement authorities."
It is noteworthy in this regard that the CVRA distinguishes
a "case" from a "proceeding."215 In two provisions, the concepts
18 USC § 3771(a)(5).
213 Black's Law Dictionary243 (West 9th ed 2009). See also Random House Webster's
UnabridgedDictionary 321 (Random House 2d ed 2001) (listing one definition of "case" as
a suit or action at law").
214 Random House Webster's UnabridgedDictionary321 (Random House 2d ed 2001).
215 Compare 18 USC § 3771(a)(2) (a crime victim has the right to "reasonable,
212

accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding,
involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused"); 18 USC § 3771(a)(3) (a
crime victim has the "right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding,
unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony
by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that
proceeding"); 18 USC § 3771(a)(4) (a crime victim has the "right to be reasonably heard at
any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any
parole proceeding"); 18 USC § 3771(a)(7) (a crime victim has the "right to proceedings free
from unreasonable delay"); with 18 USC § 3771(a)(5) (a crime victim has the "reasonable
right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case").

442

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2010:

might appear to merge, but not necessarily so. That is, 18 USC
§ 3771(d)(2) reads: "In a case where the court finds that the
number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all of
the crime victims the rights described.., the court shall fashion
a reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not
unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings."21 6 18 USC
§ 3771(d)(4) reads: "In any appeal in a criminal case, the
Government may assert as error the district court's denial of any
crime victim's right in the proceeding to which the appeal
relates." 217 One reading of these provisions might equate "case"
and "proceeding," but another interpretation reads the provision
so that "a case" encompasses "a proceeding." The results are
ambiguous.
As before, because of the contemporaneous passage and
similar subject matter of the sections of the VRRA that became
42 USC §§ 10606 and 10607, it is reasonable to read the CVRA in
pari materia with 42 USC § 10607. In 42 USC § 10607, the use of
the word "case" inarguably contemplates more than a proceeding,
action, suit, or controversy. 2 18 Section 10607(a) reads:
The head of each department and agency of the United
States engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall designate by names and office titles the
persons who will be responsible for identifying the victims
of crime and performing the services described in subsec219
tion (c) of this section at each stage of a criminal case.
The services in section (c) include providing the victim with
220 arrest, 221
notice of the status of the investigation of the crime,
and filing of charges. 22 2 A CVRA "case" must also include these
stages if the statutes are to be read consistently.
3.

A pre-charge conferral right under the CVRA does not
create an inconsistency between statutes.

Approaching the CVRA from another angle, an interpretation of the conferral right that makes the statute incompatible
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

18 USC
18 USC
VRRA §
42 USC
42 USC
42 USC
42 USC

§ 3771(d)(2) (emphasis added).
§ 3771(d)(4) (emphasis added).
503, 104 Stat 4820, codified at 42 USC § 10607.
§ 10607(a) (emphasis added).
§ 10607(c)(3)(A).
§ 10607(c)(3)(B).
§ 10607(c)(3)(C).
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with 42 USC § 10607 should be disfavored. This is a serious
challenge to finding a pre-charge conferral right in the CVRA. A
pre-charge conferral right seems to fit uncomfortably with 42
USC § 10607's requirement that the government notify the victim of the "status of the investigation of the crime," 223 the "filing
of charges against a suspected offender" 224 and the "acceptance of
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the rendering of a verdict
after trial."22 5 Nowhere in 42 USC § 10607 does it say the victim
is to be notified that a plea agreement is being reached, pre- or
post-charge. Rather, 42 USC § 10607 contemplates victim notification of the acceptance of a plea agreement, an event that
obviously takes place after negotiations have already occurred
and the opportunity to confer with the government has passed.
For the purposes of illuminating when the conferral right
attaches, however, the seeming incompatibility between a precharge conferral right and 42 USC § 10607 is inconsequential. If
42 USC § 10607's notice after-the-fact regime is incompatible
with a pre-charge conferral right, it is just as incompatible with
the existence of a conferral right after charges have been filed.
That is to say, if there is an incompatibility, it is between 42 USC
§ 10607 and the notion that victims have the right to confer with
prosecutors in relation to plea negotiations at all, not between 42
USC § 10607 and the timing of the attachment of the conferral
right.
If the after-the-fact notification regime of 42 USC § 10607 is
viewed as incompatible with the CVRA's provision of a conferral
226
right, the statutory scheme as a whole begins to look absurd.
The better interpretation views the after-the-fact notification
provisions of 42 USC § 10607 and the CVRA's rights-granting
provisions as independent and valuable provisions on their own
227
terms that should be given effect if reasonably possible.

223 42 USC § 10607(c)(3)(A) (such notification is appropriate "to the extent it is
appropriate to inform the victim and to the extent that it will not interfere with the
investigation").
224 42 USC § 10607(c)(3)(C).
225 42 USC § 10607(c)(3)(F).
226 To put the matter in its most extreme light, under 42 USC § 10607 the government
is required to notify the victim of 'the rendering of a verdict after trial," 42 USC
§ 10607(c)(3)(F), and of "the sentence imposed on an offender." 42 USC § 10607(c)(3)(G). If
0
42 USC § 1 607's after-the-fact notification is incompatible with the conferral right, then
the conferral right is effectively crowded out from the time of investigation through conviction. The legislature could not have intended this result.
227 Singer and Singer, 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.2 (cited in note
206).
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A pre-charge conferral right under the CVRA does not
impair prosecutorial discretion.

Finally, interpreting the CVRA to provide for a pre-charge
conferral right should be disfavored if doing so interferes with
prosecutorial discretion, contrary to the prohibition that
"[n]othing [in the CVRA] shall be construed to impair the
prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer
under his direction."228 A proper understanding of the purpose
and scope of the conferral right, however, makes clear that the
prosecutor's exercise of discretion is not curtailed, either pre- or
post-charge. The CVRA is not intended to stop actors within the
criminal justice system from making "decisions that victims of
crime do not like." 229 Accordingly, the conferral right gives the
victim no power to direct the prosecution. 230 Rather, the CVRA is
intended to eliminate the problem of victims being "kept in the
dark by prosecutors to [sic] busy to care enough," and to give victims the opportunity to "participate in the process where the
information that victim's [sic] and their families can provide may
be material and relevant."2 31 Thus, the conferral right "is only a
requirement that the government confer in some reasonable way
with ... victims before ultimately exercising its broad discretion,"232 not a fetter on that discretion.
More problematic for the interpretation of the CVRA advocated by this Comment is the prospect of a court having to adjudicate regarding a purported "crime victim's" entitlement to confer with the prosecutor before the government has filed charges.
Such a contest could pit the victim against the government.
One might take pause because courts have been reluctant to
second-guess the decision of prosecutors not to pursue alleged
criminal conduct, even where the private parties urging prosecution raise serious questions respecting the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.2 3 3 The reluctance is grounded in separation of
powers principles and the supposition that the courts would be
234
poor monitors of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Adjudication of failure-to-prosecute claims may also "threaten to
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

18 USC § 3771(d)(6).
150 Cong Rec S4262 (statement of Sen Feinstein).
150 Cong Rec S10911 (statement of Sen Kyl).
150 Cong Rec S4262 (statement of Sen Feinstein).
Dean, 527 F3d at 395.
See Inmates of Attica, 477 F2d at 379.
See id at 379-80. See also United States v Armstrong, 517 US 456, 464 (1992).
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chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and
decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement
policy." 235 Such litigation may give the private party discovery
access to the government's files and perhaps grand jury records,
both of which would normally be secret to protect the reputation
236
of the innocent.
Despite the seeming similarity, there are important distinctions between a failure-to-prosecute claim and a crime victim's
assertion of CVRA rights as they relate to prosecutorial discretion. In contrast to the person alleging the prosecutor's wrongful
failure to prosecute, the person asserting CVRA rights does not
ask the court to evaluate the prosecutor's decision. Rather than
ask the court to decide what the prosecutor should or should not
have done, the purported victim asks the court to take notice of
what the prosecutor is doing or has done, namely, negotiating a
plea agreement in relation to a federal offense of which she was
the victim. The court need only take cognizance of the federal
offense, and determine whether the purported victim was directly and proximately harmed. 237 Because the prosecutor's decisions
are not being second-guessed by the judiciary (other than, of
course, the prosecutor's decision to deny CVRA rights to the purported victim), the process does not raise separation of powers
concerns. In contrast to the adjudication of a failure-to-prosecute
claim, inquiry into whether a person is a crime victim does not
engage the court in a standardless evaluation of "[s]uch factors
as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence
value, the Government's enforcement priorities ... " and other
factors "not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts
are competent to undertake." 238 No doubt the adjudication of contested crime victim status will to some extent reveal to the court
the federal offenses being bargained over. It will probably not,
however, "chill" the decisionmaking process of prosecutors or reveal enforcement policy because the propriety of the process or
policy is not be at issue in such a proceeding, unlike in a failureto-prosecute action.

235
236
237
238

Armstrong, 517 US at 465.
Inmates of Attica, 477 F2d at 380.
18 USC § 3771(e).
Armstrong, 517 US at 465.
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CONCLUSION

The current recession has already brought major crimes to
light and promises to reveal more. In many cases, the victims
associated with these crimes will want to assert their rights
under the CVRA, including the right to confer with the attorney
for the government in the case, to the greatest extent possible.
Unfortunately, the statute is less than clear respecting the
earliest point at which a victim might assert his right to confer,
and respecting the character of the right once it applies.
The Dean court concluded the conferral right allows victims
to express their views on a prospective plea agreement to a
prosecutor, even when charges have not yet been filed against a
defendant. It has been the goal of this Comment to show that
this result is both preferable from a policy standpoint and
defensible as a matter of statutory interpretation. In general, if
the goal of providing crime victims with rights is to treat them
with respect and dignity, legislatures and courts should hesitate
to predicate the exercise of those rights on distinctions that are
arbitrary from the standpoint of victims.

